How Kagame masterminded RPA’s decisive campaign against Genocide within hours

When the Genocide against the Tutsi started 28 years ago today, the then Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) maintained a 600-strong force at CND (Conseil National de Développement – present-day Parliamentary Buildings at Kimihurura) whose mission was to protect Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) politicians in Kigali. The RPF politicians, who were also based at CND – which had a hotel wing –, had been expected to join a proposed broad-based transitional government and national assembly as part of the Arusha Accords between the RPF and the Juvenal Habyarimana government. But the deal collapsed when a group of radical figures within Habyarimana’s powerful Akazu (inner circle) turned against him and ordered an attack on his plane as it approached Kigali International Airport on April 6 – killing him and his entourage. Analysts say this was designed to create pretext to execute a pre-planned agenda to commit genocide against the Tutsi. “It was around 8p.m when the president’s plane crashed,” says Médard Bashana, Manager of the Campaign Against Genocide Museum. “Propagandists immediately started circulating rumours that the RPF, with support from the Belgians, were responsible for the attack. “RTLM (hate radio) was already inciting citizens and was mentioning names of potential victims and where they were allegedly hiding,” he recalls. Located at the Parliamentary Buildings (former CND), the Campaign Against Genocide Museum tells the extraordinary story of RPA’s operations against the ex-FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaises) and its rescue efforts shortly after the genocidal machine was set in motion. Predawn attacks “By dawn April 7, there were roadblocks everywhere and prominent Tutsi and moderate Hutu politicians were being killed,” observes Bashana. Some of the early victims include then Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Constitutional Court president Joseph Kavaruganda, Frederick Nzamurambaho, Landoard ‘Lando’ Ndasingwa, among others. “They had also started attacking ordinary Tutsi families across the country.” On the same morning, Col. Théoneste Bagosora, arguably the chief mastermind of the Genocide, chaired a crisis meeting which was attended by senior officials and some diplomats, including envoys of France, Belgium, Germany and Tanzania. At the meeting, Col. Augustin Ndindiliyimana was named interim leader before he was replaced with Gen Marcel Gatsinzi, who was also removed shortly after. The RPF/A, who were at the time still making sense of what was going on, were effectively sidelined from any transitional arrangement and their CND-based politicians and troops found themselves in the eye of the storm. A statue of two artillery RPA soldiers engaging the enemy at the rooftop of the Parliament Buildings. They were particularly fending off attacks from Camp GP in Kimihurura. Photo: Dan Nsengiyumva. Soon, ex-FAR forces at Camp GP and Camp Kacyiru started shelling CND. The building was also bombarded by relentless long-range firepower from ex-FAR positions at Mt Rebero, Mt Kigali and Mt Jali. “Direct assault on the building started at around 8a.m,” says Bashana. “The intention was now clear to the RPF/A; they wanted to annihilate RPF politicians and RPA soldiers who were right in the middle of enemy territory and they had launched the Genocide against the Tutsi.” Paul Kagame, then Chairman of the RPA High Command, who was based at the RPA Headquarters at Mulindi in present-day Gicumbi District, 76km north of the capital Kigali, had to make a quick decision. It was around midday on April 7 when he phoned Gen Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), asking him to intervene and stop the killings. Dallaire replied that he was powerless to do anything as his force was both thin on the ground and lacked the mandate to engage militarily. The 3rd Battalion receives reinforcement on April 11, three days after fighting broke out. Photo: Dan Nsengiyumva. Frustrated by the lack of action from the UN force despite spreading violence, at around 3p.m on April 7, Kagame issued an order to his troops to quickly swing into action. The mission was to stop the Genocide against the Tutsi, defeat genocidal forces, and rescue victims of the Genocide. “The strategic end state was to achieve a situation whereby genocide is stopped, genocidal regime is overthrown and peace is restored across the country,” Bashana points out. Kagame ordered the 600 troops of the 3rd Battalion at CND, commanded by Charles Kayonga, to break out from their positions with a view to defend themselves, rescue victims in their vicinity, and to contain advancing genocidal forces and Interahamwe militia. The 3rd battalion immediately launched a counteroffensive in four companies: Eagle, commanded by George Rwigamba; Chui, commanded by Rugambwa; Tiger, under Andrew Kagame; and Simba, under Aloys Gapfizi. Each was assigned a specific axis. How the ‘600’ stopped the enemy in their tracks Eagle advanced eastwards toward Amahoro National Stadium in Remera with a mission to rescue thousands of people who had been trapped and abandoned there. Roughly an hour later, they had defeated enemy units and managed to rescue about 5000 people at the sports complex. Chui was tasked to engage and contain advancing presidential guards from Camp GP, less than a kilometre south of CND; Tiger headed northwest to confront advancing Gendarmerie units from Camp Kacyiru; while Simba took the northeast axis to repulse attacks by military police units from Camp Kami. “They were surrounded and the idea was to stop the enemy in their tracks,” explains Bashana. “Otherwise, if they had found them at CND they would have crushed them and the politicians they were protecting.” The strategy would soon see RPA control a zone stretching to former Iposita (around Kigali Heights) to the south, King Faisal Hospital (northwest) and Mukabuga Ka Nyarutarama (north) and to Amahoro Stadium and Prince House to the east and the Rugando area. “It created an area through which rescue operations would be possible and it delayed advancing (government) forces.” At the same time, they mounted a 12.7mm heavy machine gun on the CND rooftop to help deter enemy advances from Camp GP and Camp Kacyiru. The weapon was one of the two higher caliber guns the RPA had been allowed to have at CND when they first deployed their protection force there on December 28, 1993. Operated by David Rwabinumi, the gun was instrumental in keeping the enemy at bay between April 7 and April 21, notes Bashana. Reinforcements arrive In the meantime, Kagame also ordered the bulk of the RPA forces in and around Byumba (Gicumbi) to advance. Kagame, then fondly referred to as Afande PC, first met all the top commanders at his Mulindi headquarters and briefed them about the new multipronged mission on April 7, hours after it became clear extremists within government had violently overthrown Habyarimana and launched a genocide. He formed larger formations in the form of Combined Mobile Forces or simply Mobile Forces. He tasked three Combined Mobile Forces – Alpha (under the command of Sam Kaka), Bravo (Twahirwa Dodo) and 59th (Charles Ngoga) – to head straight to the capital Kigali to reinforce the 3rd battalion. They were not to engage the enemy along the way to avoid losing time. Kagame would later in the day leave his base and travel to Miyove where he met the forces of the three Combined Mobile Forces (CMFs) for a briefing before departure. “He wanted to personally assess the physical morale of the forces and to deliver the message about their mission himself,” says Bashana. The three CMFs would begin their advance toward Kigali that same night with the sole mission of linking up with the ‘600’ in Kigali. They marched through the rugged terrain of the northern region and arrived at CND four days later (at around 3p.m on April 11), and found the ‘600’ still holding their ground. Meanwhile, five other CMFs also started advancing shortly after the ‘reinforcement force’ had left. Attacking in multipronged offensives, these forces had a broader task which included “engaging, defeating and dislodging” the enemy, as well as rescuing Genocide victims. Multipronged offensives Charles Musitu and Charles Muhire commanded the 21st and 101st mobile forces, respectively, both of them taking the main central axis – the same direction as Alpha, Bravo and 59th CMFs – heading to Kigali. Fred Ibingira and William Bagire led the 157th and the 7th Combined Mobile Forces, respectively, both advancing southeast of Byumba. Kagame also put Thadee Gashumba in charge of Charlie mobile force, which advanced via the northwestern axis, ensuring the enemy was engaged on multiple fronts across the country. A Combined Mobile Force comprised anywhere between 1200 and 1500 troops. This formation allowed each mobile force to be more agile, with capabilities to launch offensives and reinforce itself when needed, and to conduct rescue operations and treat casualties at the same time. Throughout the liberation struggle the Chairman of High Command changed strategy and military formations depending on the situation and tasks at hand and this kept the enemy guessing, says Bashana. Shortly after the forces moved to stop the killings and liberate the country, Kagame relocated from Mulindi and continued to direct the campaign through to July. In our next episodes we’ll take a look at some of the key battles and most daring operations by the RPA liberators as they marched across Rwanda in a three-month campaign.

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How Kagame masterminded RPA’s decisive campaign against Genocide within hours