Africa's Great Lakes region has, for decades now, been suffering from the DRC's unending security problems with thousands of the country's citizens living, as refugees, in neighboring countries. Constant insecurity in the Congo together with its socio-political implications denies regional countries the opportunity to cooperate on mutually beneficial political and economic programs that would spur achievement of collective interests for the masses. While the region bleeds from missed opportunities, Congo's own leaders, in succession, seem to find more comfort in perpetually blaming some neighboring countries- mainly Rwanda- for all that is wrong in their country yet showing little to no staying power to undertake measures to eliminate the security problem. For as long as Congo's leaders lack the honesty and courage to look at their country's problems in their true nature and deal with them accordingly, Rwanda will remain Congo's best scapegoat for the following reasons: Rwanda's ethnic affiliation to Congolese Tutsi communities who, for being victims of proliferating genocide ideology in the DRC, have taken up arms to defend their right to life under the umbrella of the M23. They were later embraced by other compatriots. Tutsi communities in the Congo are ethnic relatives of Rwandans. As they fight for existence in the DRC, the claim of Rwanda's material support to them sounds justified because support in the hardest of moments is to be expected of a relative. So, Congolese authorities using the claim of Rwanda's support to the M23 and not concerning themselves with the cause for which the M23 exists in the first place, gives them room to abdicate responsibility for resolving the problem. And as long as Tutsi communities in the DRC remain victims of hate speech and genocide, resistance groups will emerge from within them and such groups will, as is now, be attributed to Rwanda. Secondly, Rwanda's willingness to acknowledge and expose the root of the security crisis in the DRC where other nations are playing it safe in dealing with the DRC places it in a position of blame. Unlike other nations in the region, Rwanda has remained very firm and clear about factors and entities at play in the now decades-old security crisis in the Kivu region. Rwanda has categorically stated that anti-Tutsi and anti-Rwanda terrorist groups such as the FDLR and RUD-Urunana terrorize Tutsi communities in the Kivu region and launch attritive attacks on Rwanda from time to time. As these groups develop a bond of understanding with Congolese officials and leverage that bond to rearm and launch attacks on Rwanda, Rwanda's rebuke of Kinshasa's laxity in eliminating security risks, to Rwanda, associated with DRC becoming a hotbed of terror organization and training, more room is opened for Kinshasa's scapegoating of Kigali for Kinshasa's own failure at handling a dreadful security situation in its Eastern region. Third and most important, Rwanda's determination and commitment to nation building as opposed to DRC's living-by-the-day approach to affairs of national administration makes a disparity in pursuits which gets Rwanda caught in the crosshairs of an unstable Congo in a security predicament. Since the end of the Genocide against the Tutsi, Rwanda's leadership has pursued national cohesion and a development agenda that aims to build stable diplomatic relations, insurmountable security and a resilient economy. Unfortunately, in the same period, the Congo has become a haven for anti-Rwanda genocidal and terrorist groups. It is also during this period that the DRC has experienced rapid increases in militia groups and natural-resources-related corruption scandals and embezzlement. While Kigali makes efforts to consistently improve living standards for the masses, politicians and political actors in Kinshasa make mention of problems faced by the Congolese for the benefit of it- to gain popular support in the pursuit of their political and economic interests. Similarly, while Kinshasa's strategy seems to be wishing away its problems, Rwanda leaves nothing to fate. In this regard, Kinshasa's bond of understanding with anti-Rwanda terrorist and genocidal groups can only be expected to beget more misunderstanding between the two countries and intensify Kinshasa's blaming of Rwanda because it is not to be expected of Rwanda to let terrorist FDLR and its sister groups to rearm, reorganize and attack Rwanda. Scapegoating Rwanda can only end if the security crisis in the DRC's Kivu region is permanently resolved. And the security crisis can be permanently resolved by approaching the two most critical and distinct issues at play separately. On the one hand is the reason for the existence of the M23 and its continued fighting against the coalition of Congolese armed forces (FARDC), FDLR, Mai-Mai and other armed groups. On the other is the continued rearmament of the FDLR and its affiliate groups by the Congolese armed forces under the watch of the Congolese government. Of the two issues, continued rearmament of the FDLR and its affiliate groups by the Congolese armed forces under the watch of the Congolese government concerns Rwanda. If Kinshasa can disarm and, or repatriate members of the FDLR, threats to Rwanda's security from the group will be eliminated. Fortunately, eliminating the FDLR will also eliminate one of the major threats to the lives of Tutsi communities in the DRC and open doors to eliminating the other more than a hundred armed groups which are relatively weaker compared to the M23 and lack a logical and legitimate cause-for-existence.
