The United States announcement supporting Africa's quest for two permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) must have been received with some welcome. The enthusiasm was 'however' tempered by the stipulation that these seats would not carry veto power. This presents a dilemma for the Africans, who insist that they either get veto power or have it abolished altogether. As currently constituted, the Security Council has fifteen members. Five of these are permanent members — the P5, and include the United States, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. Each of them holds veto power. The veto grants each permanent member the authority to vote against certain UNSC decisions, including decisions the member may deem detrimental to its national interests. The other ten members of the Security Council are non-permanent, of which Africa has three seats. This means that while the non-permanent members may participate in the Council discussions and decision-making, the final say rests with the five permanent members, any of whom may veto it to protect its interests. This has been deemed unfair, thus the insistence to get the veto power or abolish it. America’s stipulation amounts to a veto. It is, therefore, doubtful the continent will have its way. Either Africa accepts the seats without the veto, or it doesn’t. But there is another conundrum closer home. Let’s assume Africa accepts the no veto condition and two of its countries become permanent members. Let’s also assume that each of its 54 countries is eligible to take the permanent seat. This presents a tricky situation. Of the many analyses examining it, one of the most unvarnished and eye-opening must be that by Ambassador Martin Kimani. He is a noted Africa watcher who has just completed a stint as Kenya’s permanent representative at the UN and is now the Executive Director of New York University’s Centre on International Cooperation. In what might seem a casual post on X (formerly Twitter), he makes searingly unflattering commentary about African countries’ capabilities in the face of the huge responsibility borne by the P5. He begins by observing that the P5 pay more than half of the UN's peacekeeping budget, which in the financial year 2023-24 is $6.1 billion. The US pays 26.94 per cent; China 18.68 per cent; the UK 5.35 per cent; France 5.28 per cent; and Russia 2.28 per cent. To match Russia's share, the least, the prospective African country would have to fork out almost $140 million a year. To wield the veto, he points out, is to be a global diplomatic player. Each member of the P5 has over 250 diplomatic representations worldwide, including embassies, high commissions, and consulates. Egypt and South Africa have Africa's largest diplomatic footprints, but their numbers are less than half of those of the P5. The intelligence used to make decisions as a permanent member cannot be found solely on the evening news, he teases. It would require the collection of signals and human intelligence far beyond what any African country is doing at present. France and the UK, for example, spend at least $1 billion a year on intelligence, the least among the P5. His back-of-the-envelope calculation surmises that it would take an African country a minimum of $1.5 billion annually, and probably closer to double or triple that figure. And, for what? he wonders. What exactly would be the return on this investment domestically? He gives a few other sobering examples, colourfully observing that an African country with UNSC ambitions “would start off as a strutting peacock before steadily declining into a plucked chicken!” But it also underscores the already acknowledged challenge of how to choose which countries will represent Africa as permanent members on the Security Council. Amb. Kimani concludes, as other experts have, that the permanent membership “would only be doable as part of a regional project, which would demand bold realignments and reforms of the @_AfricaUnion.” For now, the AU remains a coordination and consultative intergovernmental institution. It does not have supranational authority over its sovereign member states to take the two seats on their behalf. Still, it puts to question why it has taken so long not to have already resolved the issue of representation. The call for the permanent seats had been articulated in the African Union’s Common African Position in 2005 under the Ezulwini Consensus. The Consensus is a framework for cooperation and integration outlining the principles and values that should guide the continent's development, including democracy, peace, and security. It calls for a more representative and inclusive international order. In its quest to get the more powerful permanent seats, Africa is not alone. Other regions seeking it include South America and Asia. Germany and Japan are also in the running to get a seat.
