Vertical and Horizontal models of accountability

The traditional model of accountability describes a vertical chain that provides a continuum of accountability relationships between the electorate, the Parliament, the Government and the public service. Developments in administrative law over recent decades, however, have extended and strengthened the horizontal accountability of public servants and policy makers. Freedom of information legislation, the administrative decisions reviews and administrative appeals processes have created new channels for bringing information on the actions of public servants into the public domain. Public servants are now legally accountable for their actions to institutions other than the Parliament, and can be obliged to explain their actions and justify their decisions to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies. Traditionally, the primary accountability obligation of public servants is to the government of the day. Ministers are accountable to Parliament for the exercise of ministerial authority, while public servants are accountable to ministers for the exercise of delegated authority. But these hierarchical relationships have now been complemented by public servants’ duty to explain or justify their actions to various review bodies and directly to Parliamentary committees where the minister neither knew nor should have been expected to know. The legislation establishing these arrangements confers an authority or measure of control over the actions of public servants that is legally enforceable. This has had implications for the way in which decisions are made, and for the cost and complexity of the systems and processes that are maintained to support decision-making. As the model shows, public servants are accountable mostly through a vertical and hierarchical chain, but it does include some horizontal accountability to external review bodies. This accountability map includes formal processes for reporting to Parliament such as annual reports, portfolio statements, appearances before the Senate committees and the system of performance reporting on programme outcomes. In practice, public servants are also subject to corporate and management cycles within their organisations that cascade down from high-level targets and feed performance information up into the accountability chain. Other horizontal accountability arrangements are emerging. Some are less formal or confer less legal authority on the party to whom the accountability is owed, but they can nevertheless provide powerful checks on the activities of public servants. A number of public service reforms over the last few years have sought to make public servants more responsive to their clients. Rwandan public servants are encouraged to be responsive to the needs of members of the public to whom they provide services. This has been supported through mechanisms such as citizens’ charters, charging users for some services, and performance benchmarking. As is often noted, public servants are now seen as accountable outwards to the public as well as being accountable upwards through the hierarchical chain of managerial command. These horizontal relationships are likely to be of increasing importance to the new and emerging modes of policy implementation being developed to deal with complex and intractable problems. This idea of accountability is at present relatively weak and needs to be differentiated from the traditional Westminster concept. To the extent that any accountability relationship exists between a public servant and a centrelink client, for example, it is one in which the client has no direct power to call the public servant to account for his or her actions. Aggrieved citizens may lodge complaints with the service provider, or complain to their local MP, but redress through these forms of complaint ultimately relies on the good faith of the service provider. The citizen has no power to sanction the public servant other than by refusing to accept the service on offer. The power of the citizen to call the service provider to account is even weaker in the case of government services delivered by an outsourced provider. This is a significant challenge for emerging modes of policy implementation based on distributed and devolved government. A number of public service reforms over the last few years have sought to make public servants more responsive to their clients. Rwandan public servants are encouraged to be responsive to the needs of members of the public to whom they provide services. This has been supported through mechanisms such as citizens’ charters, charging users for some services, and performance benchmarking. As is often noted, public servants are now seen as accountable outwards to the public as well as being accountable upwards through the hierarchical chain of managerial command. These horizontal relationships are likely to be of increasing importance to the new and emerging modes of policy implementation being developed to deal with complex and intractable problems. This idea of accountability is at present relatively weak and needs to be differentiated from the traditional Westminster concept. To the extent that any accountability relationship exists between a public servant and a centrelink client, for example, it is one in which the client has no direct power to call the public servant to account for his or her actions. Aggrieved citizens may lodge complaints with the service provider, or complain to their local MP, but redress through these forms of complaint ultimately relies on the good faith of the service provider. The citizen has no power to sanction the public servant other than by refusing to accept the service on offer. The power of the citizen to call the service provider to account is even weaker in the case of government services delivered by an outsourced provider. This is a significant challenge for emerging modes of policy implementation based on distributed and devolved government. The author is a Development Policy Analyst.