The FDLR: Anatomy of a conflict fueling group in the Great Lakes Region

PART I Introduction The FDLR stands for “Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda” or Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. It was formed in 2000 in Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). After the defeat of the genocidal interim government (IG) in July 1994, government officials, soldiers, and Interahamwe militia fled to the DRC, where they set up a parallel government to the Government of National Unity, which had been established in Rwanda immediately after the victory of the then Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) over genocidal forces. The mentioned Interim Government led approximately two million Rwandans into exile. They carried with them many weapons, other valuable movable government assets and continued with the spread of the genocide ideology in preparation for a comeback to continue with their genocidal agenda in Rwanda. They sought the support of local Congolese people as well as the then Zairian government (now DRC), hoping to broaden their base for the eventual takeover of the government in Rwanda. The foundation for their genocidal ideology can be summarized and portrayed as follows: “Rwandan Hutus and different Congolese ethnic groups are a single Bantu people because they share some cultural traits. Tutsi are “Nilotic” invaders who, together with the related Hima people of Uganda, intend to subjugate the Bantu inhabitants”. This ideology has its roots in the Hamitic Myth, which has been proven false but continues to be preached, and whose consequences have greatly affected the whole region. The continued presence of the Ex-FAR/Interahamwe, now regrouped under the FDLR, undermines stability in the region and strains relations between DRC and Rwanda. These groups received military training and were heavily armed by the former Rwandan government in preparation for the genocide in which over one million people were killed. They were also the central cause of the Congo I and II wars and gave rise to the formation of various rebel movements in the DRC. The current escalation of conflict in North Kivu is also largely attributed to them. This on-going conflict has left thousands of people killed and other hundreds of thousands displaced. The objective of this paper is to show how the Ex FAR/FDLR has been central to the instability prevailing in the Great Lakes Region, especially in the eastern DRC, and how the security of the Great Lakes Region will remain fragile as long as this group exists. The paper is divided into four sections. Part one represents the process of formation, organization and alliances of the FDLR. It explains different metamorphoses the group has been adopting in its efforts to disguise and distance itself from the genocide label so that it may portray itself as a legitimate politico-military force, and attempt to push for negotiations with the Rwandan government. The second part covers the dimension of the threat and illustrates how this group has been central to regional instability since 1994. The third part explains how the ideology spread by the FDLR in eastern DRC intoxicated the Congolese communities and gave rise to various rebel groups, which can be divided into two opposed groups: the pro- FDLR group and the group opposed to FDLR. It further shows how the FDLR factor negatively affects relations between DRC and Rwanda. The fourth part presents numerous peace initiatives put in place to deal with the FDLR threat, although, unfortunately, these initiatives have been ineffective on the ground. 1 THE FDLR: genesis, structure and networks I.1. FDLR Predecessors After July 1994, the defeated and exiled Interim Government and ex FAR continued to operate as such for a while. The first Rwandan opposition group was formed in DRC and Tanzania’s refugee camps in 1995 and was called RDR (Rally for Democracy and Return of Refugees in Rwanda/ Rassemblement pour la Democratie et le Retour au Rwanda). It was mainly composed of politicians and military leaders from Habyarimana’s government and was officially endorsed by the high command of the defeated army in a meeting held in Bukavu on 28 and 29 April, 1995. Their main objective was to return the refugees forcefully. With the collaboration of the Tanzanian government, the refugees in Tanzania were peacefully repatriated while those in the DRC, with the support of the Mobutu regime, recruited, trained, re-armed, and prepared an onslaught on Rwanda to carry on with the genocide. When the militarised refugee camps were dismantled in November 1996, by the incursion of Rwandan forces aimed at pre-empting a major attack by the Ex-FAR/Interahamwe, more than one million refugees who had been held hostage by the genocidal force were repatriated. The reorganization of the Ex FAR/Interahamwe continued and the Mobutu regime also continued to re-arm them. In the end, those who did not return to Rwanda spread mainly in the DRC, but also in other countries such as Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Kenya and Central African Republic. When RDR failed to return refugees by force and refugee camps were dismantled by the APR operation in Zaire, the EX-FAR, Interahamwe and other young men split from the RDR. They then formed a group called ALIR (Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda – Army for the Liberation of Rwanda). Its political wing was called PALIR (Parti pour la Libération du Rwanda- Party for the Liberation of Rwanda). ALIR/PALIR was formed from the merger of the former Armed forces of Rwanda (Ex-FAR) and Interahamwe militia which orchestrated the genocide. In May 1998, ALIR launched an insurgency war, most especially in the northern part of Rwanda. This insurgency led to their eventual defeat, leaving several of their leaders dead, including Colonel Nkundiye, Lt. Colonel Dr Mugemanyi and others. The new leadership in Kinshasa did not help to deal with the Ex FAR factor. Instead, according to an ICG report, the Kabila regime concluded an agreement with them in Lubumbashi on 10 September 1998. Insurgents continued to use DRC territory, leading to the second Congo War that started in August 1998. The delegation of late Laurent Désiré Kabila, composed of Victor Mpoyo, Didier Kazadi, Mwenze Kongolo met the Ex-FAR stationed in Nairobi and reached an understanding on military cooperation. This understanding subsequently paved the way for the formation of the FDLR. The insurgency was eventually defeated in Northern Rwanda in 2001. This military failure coincided with the inclusion of ALIR on the list of terrorist organizations by the US government. This created discomfort, not only for ALIR but also for their allies in Kinshasa. ALIR had to re-invent a new identity and was called CCR (Comite de Coordination pour la Résistance- Coordination Committee for Resistance). This committee was led Dr. Casmir Bizimungu. Internal dissensions later led to the dislocation of CCR. 1.2. FDLR structure and organization The FDLR was formed in 2000 after the Kinshasa-based command (ALIR 2) and the Kivu-based Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR 1) agreed to merge. The group subsequently adopted a new name FDLR, after ALIR had been declared a terrorist group by the US State Department. This was also in a bid to elude justice since most of ALIR leaders participated in 1994 Rwandan genocide. FDLR immediately opened up antennas and appointed as representatives those living in Europe and America such as Dr Ignace Murwanashyaka (Germany), current FDLR chief, JMV Higiro (USA) and Alexis Nshimiyimana (Austria). Since then, FDLR began working as a politico-military organization (May 2000) with FOCA as its military wing.Following several days of talks with Congolese government representatives, the FDLR announced, on 31 March 2005, that they were abandoning their armed struggle and returning to Rwanda as a political party. The talks were held in Rome, Italy, and were mediated by Sant’Egidio. The agreement of Sant’Egidio led to the split of the FDLR into two groups, as some members accused the main stream FDLR of betraying their own cause, i.e. the “Hutu cause”. Ideological stand vis á vis the genocide in Rwanda, regionalism and money issues are the main cause for internal scissions within FDLR. On the ground FDLR is currently divided into the following groups: R-FDLR (Rally-Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) was created on 12 September 2006. It is led by Dr Jean Marie Higiro and Felicien Kanyamibwa and has changed the name into RUD-Urunana (Rassemblement pour l’Unite et la Democratie/ Rally for Unity and Democracy-Urunana). It is supported, since 20006, by a military wing called AN- Imboneza headed by Col. Jean Damascene Ndibabaje a.k.a Maj. Musare. This split is really a result of internal power struggle and regionalism (which part of Rwanda they originate from). Its military capacity is of one brigade. FDLR-CMC (Commandement Militaire pour le Changement/ Military Command for Change) was created in June 2005 by Major Gen. Seraphin Bizimungu, alias Amani Mahoro, following a disagreement between him and Maj Gen. Mudacumura. It is currently led by Hakizimana Emmanuel and Lt. Col Christophe Hakizabera. As the situation is today, FDLR has three factions but Higiro’s and Murwanashyaka’s are strong because they have active military forces. Rastas, These are heteroclite elements from FDLR, the Congolese Mai Mai and the Bashi militia called Mudundu 40 and they are more criminal militia rather than a combating rebel group. The FDLR is as organized as a standing army. It has a High Command, Staff Headquarters, Military Police, Military Training School and a Reserve Brigade. It has two military divisions, one in North Kivu and another one in South Kivu. Each of them has 4 battalions. It is currently well organized in Eastern DRC. In North Kivu Province, it is present especially in Zone Rutshuru, Masisi, and surrounding areas of Goma Town and it is openly operating day and night in south-west Lubero and Virunga National Park. In South Kivu Province, the FDLR is still at large in Fizi, Walungu (Kaniola), Kabare, Mwenga, Uvira, Shabunda and Kalehe. In all these areas, its units are co-located with FARDC forces and have benefited from their logistical support including in the current conflict in North Kivu where the two forces are involved in joint operations against CNDP forces of the renegade general, Laurent Nkunda. FDLR activities are conducted by a political wing and a military wing. The political direction operates from DRC and Europe. The military headquarters is officially based in Masisi, Kolonge locality. Another critical question about the FDLR is their military strengths: how many are they? The number of FDLR soldiers in the DRC is still unknown. In 2001, the DRC government estimated at 6,000 FDLR forces integrated in the DRC army and 40 000 FDLR operating in both Kivus. The ICG report of 23 May 2003, estimated the number of FDLR in DRC at about 22,000, with 8,000 being in North Kivu and 14,000 in South Kivu. MONUC estimated at about 25 000 the total number of FDLR in the Congo. Currently,MONUC estimates at 8,000 the number of FDLR soldiers in both Kivus (2,000 in South and 6,000 in North Kivu), whereas an independent research evaluates their number at about 7,000 in Eastern DRC. Security sources in Rwanda estimate the FDLR number in the Kivus at about 10,000- 12,000 soldiers. The FDLR has all sorts of weapons, old and modern, and they include those arms taken from FARDC stocks recently. Tomorrow in PART II: FDLR networks: the links with other political groups opposed to Rwanda