Negotiating with terrorists? Well, this depends pretty much on what one understands by both terms ‘terrorists’ and ‘negotiation’. One would try to define it as listening and being prepared to make concessions, to those who use violence against civilians to achieve political aims. The purpose of this article is to question the validity of the narrative that ‘democracies’ do not negotiate with terrorists which is quite contradictory in practice and also to examine if such negotiations would be even thinkable, let alone being possible in the context of the Great Lakes region where some ‘democratic’ states indirectly push for such an outcome even though they still view the region as the ‘not so democratic’.From a Eurocentric view, some argue that this debate is really relevant only in ‘democracies’ as dictators would have no interests in negotiation, but this contradicts the post 9/11 realities as the West saw a dramatic change in the security structure, shift in political discourse and move to a ‘no negotiation’ policy position when dealing with terrorists who are explicit security threats. The argument against negotiating with terrorists is simple. Democracies must never give in to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. In other words, negotiations give legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and undermine actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Talks can destabilize the negotiating governments’ political systems, undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent, they insist. Let us not dwell on the premise of the above argument for a moment, instead have a quick look at few pros and cons of negotiating with terrorists, as the ultimate aim should always be to find ways by which to arrive at a peaceful conclusion. In general, (1) negotiation is the simplest form of keeping an open dialogue with terrorist groups, understanding them and encouraging them to take part in the political process without arms. The opposite side to that, however, is that by opening the dialogue gives them the political legitimacy which they do not deserve; hence it is better to have no relationship whatsoever until they renounce violence. This shows they voluntarily opted out the democratic process. (2) Historical accounts show that negotiations have led ceasefires (i.e. Bill Clinton’s negotiation with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, PLO and John Major’s secret talks with the Irish Republican Army, IRA) both of which aimed at advancing peace in respective regions. The counterargument would be that terrorists want all or nothing (only with few exceptions, of course) and fragile peace in the Northern Ireland took time whereas the Middle East has never seen meaningful peace. Back to the question as to whether ‘democracies’ do dirty deals with terrorists, and yes in practice they do often negotiate with terrorists. It is public knowledge for instance, that the British government maintained a secret back channel to the IRA even after it had launched a mortar attack on 10 Downing Street that nearly eliminated the entire British cabinet in 1991. Other countries such as Spain (i.e. sat down with the separatist group Basque know by its acronym ETA in 1988) only six months after the group had killed 21 shoppers in a supermarket bombing, and Israel that is known for being tough on terrorism (i.e. secretly negotiated the Oslo accords in 1993) even though the PLO continued its terrorist activities and refused to recognize the state of Israel. What is clear here is the disconnect between what governments publicly say and what they actually do, and the problem with the ‘no negotiations’ rigid stance has consequently prevented any systematic and meaningful research on how best to conduct such negotiations. It leaves the following questions open: How can a ‘democratic’ country talk to terrorists without jeopardizing the integrity of its political system? What kind of terrorists are susceptible to negotiations? When should negotiations be opened? In the light of recent suggestions by the Tanzanian President at the African Union (AU) Summit that Rwanda should negotiate with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) - a movement on the list of terrorist organisations and accused of having participated in the 1994 genocide that took over a million Rwandan souls, one would wonder why he thought this debate had a merit. However, this is as an academic talk that is possibly more appropriate for a classroom full of college students enrolled on peace or war and conflict courses in some furthest lands with little knowledge of regional context and reality. When and why did he take such position and more importantly why now? In politics, there is a theory of political timing which gives the opportunity for politicians to control and influence the events in such way as to maximize the political benefits. For example, they will use the media platforms (i.e. news) to increase public attention and sway their electors. This incident however turned out to be a sum of political opportunism and muddled diplomacy given the leader’s familiarity of regional political dynamics and great knowledge of the FDLR’s link to the genocide that still troubles the moral conscience of the world, and subsequent mayhem in the Eastern DR Congo.So what does this tell us about the regional politics? What about the East African Community (EAC) train that is supposedly moving on the same direction? How about the EAC joint military training exercises? Any related or unrelated dimensions to the intervention brigade force? Clearly, there is a need for common understanding and approach on how to tackle security problems in the Great Lakes region, and so far the regional leaders have appeared to be unified in that front; but one hopes the recent divergence in opinion is not going to derail that process. This is not an alarm that cooperation among EAC states will be affected, nor does one believe it would right for the community; but it is critically important for the citizens of the region to be informed of these matters as they have potential implications on the countries’ relations.Is it politics, stupid? I guess sometimes, the answer is simply yes! Some would argue that the region is suffering from a security crisis, but others would rather say, it is a political one. Simple arithmetic would have made us believe that leaders in the region share views on how to combat various armed groups in the region, but some of us are probably naive and should stick with the idea that truth only belongs to God. It is customary in international relations that any country’s political sovereignty must be respected and in this case, Rwanda’s national security matters are not the prerogative of a foreign President. Call it a diplomatic incident or else but asking for an independent states to negotiate with an armed group whose agenda is to kill and maim Rwandans is very insensitive and, one hopes this issue will be dealt with swiftly in a mature way by the respected countries.