DR Congo: The strategic mistake made in 2013 should not be repeated
Saturday, July 22, 2023
General Sultani Makenga, the commander of the M23 rebel group in Eastern DR Congo. File

The eastern DR Congo conflict has its particular complexities but they can be solved sustainably when objectivity becomes the guiding philosophy.

The Pan-Africanist tools of analysis should be the guiding star – looking at issues affecting Africans, as Africans, not as colonial masters would.

Enforcing Peace is one in an ensemble of modus operandi to attain peace on behalf of nationals of a country (region) engulfed in conflict. In the process of peacekeeping, it has been realized the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement continue to become insignificant. This is due to the fact that peace operations seem not to be limited to a particular activity.

Peacekeeping hinges on three basic principles - consent of the parties in conflict, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate given.

Peacekeeping has to be flexible. Peacekeeping operations are multifaceted and should not only maintain peace and security but also facilitate the political process, protect civilians, help in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and facilitate the restoration of rule of law.

The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a military formation that constitutes part of the United Nations Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO) sanctioned by the Security Council in March 2013 to use force against armed groups in eastern DR Congo, should have taken cognizance of the above principles above.

The task ahead of the brigade was enormous given the terrain and multitude of armed groups with varying agenda ranging from pure criminality to authentic political, social and economic demands.

Scientific methods of work, not trial and error, are at the center of achieving sustainable peace in DR Congo. Cause–effect phenomenon is a simple formula to follow. The UN brigade had to be equipped not only militarily but essentially politically, more so in matters to do with regional and international dynamics or politics. The standoff in DR Congo that has bedeviled this subcontinent stems from a history shaped by the colonial world in the context of world imperialism. Former President Mobutu Sese Seko became a tool of the imperialists against the Pan-Africanists championed by former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Lumumba was assassinated just like a number of other progressive nationalists across Africa at the dawn of decolonization. The leaders who took over from colonialists at the dawn of independence, fell prey to the divide-and-rule tactics used by the former colonial masters in most of Africa.

Mobutu got dislodged by military means. The situation in DR Congo had ripened for a revolutionary change but there was no internal factor (people in the country) to take advantage of it. In such circumstances, the external factor fills the vacuum but cannot sustainably solve the internal problems without an internal cadre ship. The removal of Mobutu was so haste that the Congolese people got surprised. The stupor they fell in lingers on and it has made it hard to build viable state institutions. This is the crux of the matter.

In case of an armed struggle, the army is always at the forefront of change. In any setup of state institutions, security organs play a primordial role in the process of socio-economic progress. DR Congo is lacking in this.

The UN’s Force Intervention Brigade should have targeted the origins of the conflict – the FDLR, a terror group founded by remnants of the masterminds of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda who fled to eastern DR Congo as refugees. The Rwandan genocidal militia, and other foreign and local Congolese armed groups, should have been the primary target. The FDLR especially harbors a dangerous extremist genocide ideology that is a threat not only to DR Congo and Rwanda but the entire region.

Peace with the M23 rebels who are fighting for their persecuted community’s rights should have been given a chance.

The FIB should not have fallen into the trap of DR Congo propaganda by some government officials who thought force was the answer. The Congolese army, with tens of thousands of troops, failed to use military force.

Above all, helping DR Congo to build state institutions was vital if there was to be sustainability in the process of nation-state building.

The strategic mistake made in 2023 should not be repeated. Let the EAC peace initiatives be given a chance. Peace with communities that have legitimate rights and concerns, not war and negative propaganda, is paramount.

Pan-African wisdom should prevail so the African great lakes region can enjoy peace at last.