The re-emergence of the M23 group in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo after a decade of inaction has, once more, raised heated debate about Congo’s security fiasco in the region. Many analysts and political commentators seem to believe and advance Kinshasa’s main line of argument which is that Rwanda, mainly, and Uganda, to some extent, are directly involved in destabilizing the Congo’s eastern region in an attempt to steal the country’s mineral resources. Believing this narrative stems from a point of total ignorance of or limited knowledge about the dynamics of the affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo and their historical underpinnings. Ignorance of historical factors contributing to the current state of things in the Congo and the region as well as Kinshasa’s repeated crying incites a feeling of pity towards the Democratic Republic of Congo which is a trigger reason for many people’s shared sense of sympathy for rulers in Kinshasa and animosity towards the M23 group. This is the line of least resistance for anyone except, of course, the M23 and directly affected neighbouring states.

While most people in the region have their eyes fixated on the vastness of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s lands and its mineral resources as basis for determining factors at play in the security crisis in the country, it comes as no surprise that most Rwandans, Ugandans and Burundians focus their attention on the narrowness of DRC leadership’s political stamina in dealing with problems as they ensue. This difference of focus between Rwandans, Ugandans and Burundians on one side and citizens of other regional nations on the other can be attributed to the "privilege of distance” by which people close to a furnace feel its scorching heat while others afar get amazed by its flare. For Rwanda and Burundi, victims of hate speech and anti-Rwanda rhetoric in the Democratic Republic of Congo are ethnic relatives. And on the other hand, perpetrators of such atrocities against Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese- majorly Tutsi- are staunch enemies of the Rwandan State whose objective is to cause discord and push forward with their Tutsi extermination agenda. For Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo sheltering an anti-Uganda terror outset (ADF) implies that Uganda’s security from the terror group heavily depends on efforts, individually or jointly, the DRC government puts into eliminating or, to the least, weakening the terror organization. With RED Tabara as a security nuisance to the Burundian government, Burundi’s security, as much as Rwanda’s and Uganda’s, equally depends on DRC leaders’ understanding of the security risk posed by armed groups operating from its territory. Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, for decades now, share the heavy burden of Congolese refugees, some of whom are kith and kin to the resilient M23 fighters whose cause is to put an end to perpetual suffering and massacres of Congolese Tutsi by FDLR, Mai-Mai and, on some occasions, the Congolese national army- FARDC- and, as well, repatriation and resettlement of all Congolese refugees.

On the other hand, however, are nationals of countries not directly neighbouring the Democratic Republic of Congo who view the country in an economic lens giving themselves no room to feel for victims of Kinshasa’s amateurish handling of problems on its territory. To those comrades, the DRC is a "mineral rich nation” and not a nation with very poor governance mechanisms deficient of social amenities whose political and military leaders’ core interest is enriching themselves by looting the country’s resources with the conspiracy of foreign entities rather than resolving security and socioeconomic crises in the country. Excited at the Democratic Republic of Congo’s potential trade benefits for themselves, our comrades in the region ignore the, now common, fact that the Democratic Republic of Congo’s security problems have roots in its open-arms-approach towards genocidaires, more specifically former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR), now FDLR. And that a lasting solution to the DRC’s problems cannot be attained in Luanda nor in Nairobi while political actors in Kinshasa remain unwilling to accept the need to cut ties with the FDLR whose existence and continued activities in the country’s Kivu region is an existential threat to Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese in that region. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Hutu extremists, who are on the run for the genocide they committed in Rwanda, are openly collaborating with the national army of a country that hosts, as its citizens, a victim population (Congolese Tutsi) yet people, in the region and beyond, are either blaming victims for their fate or playing along the foreign invasion narrative regularly recycled by entities in Kinshasa who should, otherwise, be responsible for the protection of the people whose lives are at stake.

Treating the DRC as a mineral rich country inadvertently highlights the idea that the country is under foreign invasion because of its minerals, which keeps open the window for continuity of an amateurish governance system which further deprives the country’s citizens of a chance for reorganization and political reform needed.

Overall, it may be argued that as long as some people in the region, out of ignorance, jingoism or for reasons of vested interests, keep the argument that the Democratic Republic of Congo is a mineral rich nation whose immediate neighbours are illegally and illegitimately trying to get a share of its wealth, a lasting solution to the country’s and the Great Lakes’ security dilemma will remain unachievable. For that matter, the current situation should be an opportune moment to drop political scepticism and blame towards some of Congo’s neighbours and instead question utterances and actions of the political establishment in the Democratic Republic of Congo in relation to their collaboration with and support for armed groups and the resultant complex security climate in the country in particular and the region at large.