Peace in eastern DR Congo remains a bridge too Far
Saturday, August 31, 2024
The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) operating with the FDLR genocidal group in fighting against the M23 in eastern DR Congo. Courtesy

Angolan President João Lourenço has been at the forefront of several efforts, attempting to bring peace in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo).

On August 21 and 22, President Lourenço as the mediator, brought together foreign ministers from DR Congo and Rwanda to address the ongoing crisis. The meeting was supposed to build on the progress made during the previous one on July 30, where a ceasefire agreement was reached.

The ceasefire that was supposed to be in place by August 4 was a focal point of the discussions. While the ceasefire had been "largely observed" according to Congolese Minister Thérèse Wagner Kayikwamba, fighting resumed during the summit itself, with Congo River Alliance, known by its French name Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). The AFC/M23 rebel group clashed with armed groups allied with the Congolese army. The breakdown of the ceasefire underscored the challenges faced by the mediators in enforcing compliance.

One of the proposals put forward by Angola was to strengthen the verification mechanism established in Goma, which was led by Angolan General Joao Massone. This mechanism, which has been in place since 2022, is tasked with monitoring the ceasefire and ensuring its adherence.

Angola suggested expanding the team by adding members from both the DRC and Rwanda, with a possible contribution from MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC).

However, this proposal was not formally approved during the summit, leaving the verification mechanism under-resourced and ineffective in curbing the violence.

Another key point of contention was the neutralization of the genocidal group Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). The DRC had submitted a plan to neutralize the FDLR on April 26, 2024, which was later revised by the Angolans to include Rwanda's input.

While the plan was reportedly endorsed by security experts from the different parties during a meeting in Goma on August 19, its implementation remains uncertain. Rwanda views the neutralization of the FDLR as a prerequisite for any disengagement of forces, whereas the DRC and Angola believe both processes should be launched simultaneously.

This difference in approach has stalled progress, with neither side willing to compromise.

The Congolese government accuses Rwanda of deliberately stalling discussions on this point to force the DRC into negotiations with the AFC/M23 rebels, something President Félix Tshisekedi has vehemently opposed. This deadlock has made it impossible to move forward with a disengagement plan, further exacerbating the conflict on the ground.

Tshisekedi’s intransigence is a stumbling block

For the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes to deliver meaningful peace, a crucial shift must occur in President Felix Tshisekedi's stance on the AFC/M23 rebels. His refusal to negotiate with the group, rooted in the belief that AFC/M23 is a mere extension of Rwandan influence rather than a legitimate Congolese movement, mirrors the parable of the naked king—a leader surrounded by sycophants who dare not speak the truth, thus leading him into self-deception.

The AFC/M23 rebels, while undeniably composed of many Tutsi individuals, are not simply a proxy for Rwandan interests. The movement includes members from various Congolese tribes, including the Hutu of North Kivu, the Hunde, the Bashi and Baluba, the latter of which is the President's own tribe and many others. President Tshisekedi is very much aware of the fact. The head of the AFC is Corneille Nangaa who was the President of DRC’s National Electoral Commission, and a native of Haut-Uele Province which borders South Sudan and Central African Republic. This diversity underlines the fact that the grievances fueling the conflict are deeply rooted in Congolese soil, not foreign intervention. Ignoring this reality and branding the group as a mere tool of Rwanda distracts from the internal issues that need to be addressed to achieve lasting peace.

The Luanda and Nairobi peace processes were conceived with the aim of addressing the multi-faceted conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, their potential is severely hampered by Tshisekedi’s intransigence on the AFC/M23 issue.

By dismissing the group as a foreign entity, Tshisekedi is not only denying their identity as bonafide Congolese and their local grievances but also undermining the broader peace efforts. His refusal to engage in dialogue with the group effectively stalls the peace processes, leaving the conflict unresolved and allowing violence to persist.

Tshisekedi’s position is particularly problematic because it perpetuates a narrative that obscures the true nature of the conflict. The parable of the naked king is apt here—Tshisekedi’s refusal to acknowledge the Congolese roots of AFC/M23 and his insistence on viewing the group through the lens of foreign aggression is akin to the king’s delusion that he is clothed.

Just as the king’s courtiers were too fearful or sycophantic to point out his nakedness, so too are Tshisekedi’s advisors and international allies hesitant to challenge his flawed perception of AFC/M23. This creates an echo chamber where the reality of the conflict is distorted, and effective solutions are sidelined.

For the peace processes to succeed, it is imperative that Tshisekedi’s stance evolves. Negotiating with AFC/M23 is not an admission of defeat; rather, it is a recognition of the need to address the legitimate concerns of all parties involved. The AFC/M23’s grievances—ranging from issues of marginalization and ethnic violence to political representation—reflect broader challenges within the DRC that must be addressed if peace is to be achieved.

Moreover, Tshisekedi’s refusal to engage with AFC/M23 is counterproductive to his own goals. By labeling the group as terrorists he can’t talk to or a Rwandan ploy, he certainly strengthens their resolve and bolsters their narrative that they are fighting against an unjust and unrepresentative government. This hardline stance also alienates segments of the Congolese population who sympathize with AFC/M23’s cause, further deepening the divisions within the country.

The international community, particularly those involved in the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes, must play a more proactive role in encouraging Tshisekedi to reconsider his position.

Diplomatic pressure, coupled with incentives for dialogue, could help shift his perspective and pave the way for more inclusive negotiations. Additionally, efforts should be made to address the underlying issues driving the conflict, such as land disputes, systemic discrimination and persecution of some Congolese communities, insecurity caused by genocidal FDLR and dozens of militias armed by the government, hundreds of thousands of refugees in neighbouring countries, violent crimes including cannibalism, the equitable distribution of resources...etc

This article was first published by www.ajazeera.net

@TomNdahiro