Rwanda is not in the business of giving lessons. 

I do not know whether bands of angels break out in song in heaven when they observe how far the country has come since 1994, but I suspect that considering progress ushered in by vision 2020, and the dreams contained in Rwanda’s vision 2050, what my generation is living through is nothing less than a miracle. 

The road travelled has been exciting, the one ahead likely even more. 

But what about the road Rwanda chose not to travel in the aftermath of the Genocide against the Tutsi? What would have happened if we had gone down that road? Perhaps that is where the lessons lie.

Let’s go back to 1994. Over a million people dead, the country in ruins, broke, poor, and miserable.  

Some in the "International Community”, pessimistic about Rwanda’s viability and its capacity to survive are thinking about its breakup into ethnic fiefdoms or at best, survival as an international community protectorate. 

Dozens of NGOs and regional organizations, many with more resources than common sense descend on Kigali with a self-defined mission of stitching Rwanda back together, backed by foreign troops operating under an unclear and inadequate UN Mandate. 

Rwanda is described as a complex emergency and discussions are ongoing about multi-institutional missions to include restructuring domestic institutions and providing large cash infusions to mainly International Organizations for reconstruction and reconciliation. 

Most agree on the need for a multiethnic state but promote institutions that support ethnic partition at every level of government. The programs critical for durable reconciliation are out-sourced because Rwandans can not be trusted to manage their own recovery. 

Justice after genocide is entrusted to an International Criminal Tribunal, manned by foreigners, and operating in another country, leaving little energy and few resources for the reconstruction and development of Rwandan courts.  

As a result, it is difficult to uphold the rule of law or control corruption in Rwanda. 

This, in turn, discourages foreign direct investment and stifles private sector development. 

International do-gooders with good or not so good intentions, deep pockets and little or no historical knowledge and incoherent plans work at cross purposes.  

They initiate plans, only to abandon them in the face of distraction. They are easily fatigued or become complacent.  

Civil society becomes the default vehicle for political development and ethnic reconciliation in lieu of serious investment in State building. 

The results soon become evident. Westerners come into Kigali with money. We waste their money, and they waste our time. Post conflict transition is a complex process. You outsource it at your peril.

After a few years, the International Community decides its time for a new Rwandan constitution. They commission a major Western think tank to spearhead the effort.

 In the meantime, there is a belated realization that security sector reform is critical. But the International Community overreaches in its demands, overreacts to its failures and is unprepared for the consequences. 

Perhaps a 400-person training presence with no peace keeping authority is authorized. Meanwhile, Rwandans look on at first with bemused detachment, but soon the loss of credibility strengthens ethnic chauvinist politicians and parties.

A system based on ethnicity and rewards those who appeal to fear and ethnic chauvinism and extremism is strengthened. 

Global public opinion sees Rwanda as 'a simple legitimate humanitarian project'. 

Savvy Local political entrepreneurs with divisive agendas pose as saviors of specific communities, pose as humanitarians only interested in alleviating the suffering of a poor population with neither voice nor future. 

A disgusted International Community, exasperated by lack of progress, soon washes its hands of the whole problem, blames incorrigible Rwandans mired in atavistic tribal hatreds and turns its attention elsewhere.  The result is a redivision of Rwanda and a return to Civil war.

That Rwanda did not travel down this road, as it so easily could have, is due to the Rwandan Patriotic Front and its leader, President Paul Kagame.  

Rwanda’s experience has proved that post conflict state building is not for the faint-hearted. It is not a problem to be solved but a process to be managed. 

It requires local ownership determination, grit, persistence and vision.  

Simply throwing money and resources at the problem is neither desirable nor sustainable. 

International hubris in the absence of committed visionary local leadership simply creates perverse incentives, spawns extremists and eventually undermines national unity. 

Rwanda chose not to travel down that road. She should continue on the road she has chosen, and where there is no road, continue clearing paths that others on the African Continent and elsewhere may eventually widen into roads.