The recent but surprising alliance between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to sort out once and for all the threats posed by the genocidal forces lurking the jungles of eastern DRC is actually an illustration of how African governments should move on to  challenge and to confront head on their own problems.

This is a completely new trend that is emerging within the Great Lakes region. As western solutions have largely proved futile, it is time now policy makers embraced the concept of ‘African solutions to African problems’ going by what is currently unfolding within the security dynamics of the Great Lakes region. Part of this thinking should be seen within the light of Africa developing its own capacity for conflict resolution.
Pacifying eastern DRC is actually a key pointer of bringing the entire country under sustainable peace. The success likely to be registered in pacifying eastern DRC will inform stakeholders on the best approaches Africa should employ in developing its capacity to resolve Africa’s own problems, especially bloody civil wars. The stakes are indeed high.

The RDF boots in DRC

The Rwandan genocide opened a new chapter in the history of DRC. The tragedy actually sent shock waves throughout the troubled Great Lakes region of Africa. The volatility in the eastern DRC can be clearly seen as a consequence of the Rwandan genocide.

This is due to the fact that the remnants of the authors of the Rwandan genocide now regrouped under the label known as the FDLR were offered a safe passage and a permanent abode into this region.

Political analysts are quick to point out that interstate wars are ‘the logical follow on to intrastate wars and vice versa’.

Meaning that for the case of Rwanda and her western neighbuor, the export of the genocidal enterprise to DRC after the aftermath of the 100 day Rwandan blood bath ignited what is now referred to as the first and second Congo wars.

In both the wars the Rwandan armed forces-the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) was militarily involved.When it was apparent that the international community was not doing enough to contain the security threats posed by the genocidaires to Rwanda’s security, Rwanda was left with no option but to militarily engage negative forces inside the jungles of DRC.

The RDF campaigns in DRC as a security stabilizing force has succeeded in containing the threats posed by so called FDLR, in as far as its security issues are concerned.

15 years down the line and immediately after crossing the borders to enter the DRC as a rebel outfit the FDLR has been severely weakened and their incursion into Rwanda has largely been unsuccessful.

For instance, it has not succeeded in ‘finishing off the job it set out to do in 1994’.

However along the way international efforts in developing the resumption of peace has largely been futile as the FDLR has thwarted all diplomatic moves to have it disarmed and repatriated in a voluntary manner.

This has prompted the latest moves in which Joseph Kabila seemed to have heeded to political realities on the ground by joining forces with Rwanda to bring the eastern Congo to order.

The RDF is the region’s foremost security services agency. Its professionalism is bound to bring to book the FDLR forces lurking within the jungles of the eastern DRC once and for all.

Bringing the eastern DRC to order

Laurent Kabila who succeeded Mobutu sowed the seeds of future chaos within the DRC by training and arming the various militias who were fighting the governments of her neighbours.

The rehabilitation and rearming of rebel groups and their many different agendas further complicated the security dynamics within the Kivus which offered bases for these rebels.

When Joseph Kabila ascended to the presidency, he opted for a military solution to sort out the troubled east, which went hand in hand with a xenophobic ideology that wasopenly being promoted by some in his party.

This meant that there was no possibility of reconciliation with the other stakeholders within the Kivus, whom they saw as puppets of Kigali.

Similarly, the leaders of the Congolese Hutu and Tutsi communities of the east argued that that the conflict was really about identity, and as such their very survival was at stake. That is how personalities such as Laurent  Nkunda emerged.

Thus what was needed was a political solution first and foremost as no military solution to the crisis in the east could midwife peace sustainably. The Congolese army is too disorganised and poorly trained to institute a blanket authority over the east.

If it had to address the crisis in the east, the Kabila government had to find a radically different formula that was bound to enable him give up some ground within the political realities on the ground.

The disputes had given spoilers in the east and in Kinshasa an opportunity to undermine the peace process as they perceived it as threatening their interests. Both sides had been averse to sincere political negotiations.

Kabila needed to isolate the spoilers—a small group of military extremists and a few minor politicians—and come to terms with the rest of the leadership in the east.

The same applied to Rwanda when it became apparent that Nkunda as an easterner was not reading the signs of changing times. He was arrested and neutralised for the larger peace process to fold out.

Part of solving the puzzle rested in urgently addressing the continued presence of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in the east, as committed to in the 2002 Pretoria Agreement and the 1999 Lusaka Agreement. This meant the Congolese army had to apply what military pressure it is capable of on the FDLR.

For it to do so, it had to call upon support and once the political issues were sorted out at political and bilateral levels between Rwanda and DRC such an operation could also be a first step towards reconciliation with Kigali and other elements in the east  which have accused Kinshasa of supporting the extremist militia.

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