FDLR is reported to have made demands that are not acceptable to Rwanda, including the recognition by the government that there had been widespread massacres of Hutus as well as Tutsi (‘the second genocide’ theory), and to be allowed to operate as a political party in Rwanda.

Other FDLR interests may include:

. Continue to mobilise and enlarge its support-base while playing on the atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust to antagonise Rwanda and DRC into another war,
. Capitalize on any negative depiction of the regime to drive home its agenda, using ‘sensational news’, break-away high-profile dissidents, inequalities between the centre and peripheries, or the who’s who catalogue in today’s Rwanda in support of the claim that, in Rwanda, politics, ethnicity and access to resources have not changed, only that the ‘minority group’ is now in power,
. Secure for its members amnesty with regard to their involvement in crimes committed in 1994,
. Perpetuate the pre-1994 politics of majority-along-ethnic-lines ‘democracy’ that would enable a return to power of its leadership, and  finish-off the execution of the ‘final solution to the Tutsi problem’.

FDLR may also have an interest in playing for time hoping that, along the way, alliances might shift – as they did in previous years –, and support may come from new and former allies to their cause.

Inside Rwanda, a dramatic shift in the current political set-up might provide FDLR with the space it needs; a split within the Presidential political party (RPF), for example, is likely to divert the attention of state security organs, perhaps long enough for FDLR to rearm and regroup.

Best Alternatives

Having identified the interests at stake, the next stage in negotiation analysis involves answering the question: what is my best alternative to negotiation?

What is my counterpart’s?

The obvious Rwandan alternative to negotiation with FDLR is the use of force. The difficulty with earlier strikes was that, without a coordinated effort with authorities in DRC, domestic resources in DRC were diverted into resisting Rwanda’s military advance on FDLR.

Because personnel and equipment were spread to handle many fronts at once, including the DRC army and its allies, FDLR was able to survive.

In addition, DRC policy towards FDLR has followed an incoherent and contradictory course, with the army sometimes supporting, sometimes attacking the group, according to perceived interests at any particular time.

Given the inability of the Congolese government and the international community to find an adequate solution to the FDLR issue, beyond labelling it ‘a pretext’ for Rwanda’s interference in DRC, together with the ideological basis and inacceptable demands of FDLR, Rwanda has a legitimate and morally justified reason to take every necessary step to disband and eradicate the group.

A joint DRC-Rwanda operation stands a better chance to isolate FDLR and force it either to surrender or to take the heat.

FDLR may still entertain its commitment to overthrowing the current government of Rwanda.

Its best alternative to negotiation is therefore to build-up its military capabilities, launching attacks on Rwanda’s territory with a view to establish control over a portion of its territory and position itself as a credible challenge to Kigali.

It could also operate on the LRA model, in Northern Uganda, conducting occasional hit and run operations from its bases in DRC, causing havoc among civilians inside Rwanda thereby provoking the country into invading DRC again, with its attendant risks and regional dynamics.

Potential Outcomes

Are there potential outcomes that can satisfy the interests of Rwanda and those of FDLR better than their respective ‘best alternatives’?

Indeed, if a party has an alternative that is clearly superior to any possible negotiated agreement, why negotiate?

Rwanda’s position for a long time has been that FDLR members are free to return, as individuals or groups, as long as political conditions, especially negotiations, are not set, and all who took part in the 1994 genocide are held accountable.

Negotiations, however, offer the potential advantage of resolving the FDLR issue without the costs (whether short-term or long-term) that are part and parcel of any military confrontation. Although Rwanda enjoys a clear military superiority over FDLR, the use of force is not without its risks.

FDLR combatants are battle-tested from decades of fending off domestic and external threats in DRC. Having lived in Eastern DRC region for the last fifteen years, perhaps they enjoy the advantage of familiarity with the vast territories of North Kivu.

Many of the same fighters have, at various times, been instrumental in stopping local militias from overrunning government forces in DRC.

Some reports even suggest that FDLR forces were involved in ‘regime change’ in as faraway places as Congo-Brazzaville and Central African Republic.

As Rwanda knows too well, most combat operations have spill-over effects. They displace civilian population causing humanitarian crisis, or produce refugees who seek shelter in neighbouring states, causing turmoil there, too.

Despite the agreement reached with Kinshasa to conduct joint military operations, high levels of mistrust and hostility by the local population, militias and members of DRC military forces would also have to be managed.

In addition, while the operation to eradicate FDLR may be successful, the question of protecting the Congolese Tutsi from discrimination and persecutions may require a long-term post combat strategy.

FDLR may try to enlist others militias in their cause, or receive support from a sympathetic nation or enemy of Rwanda, and war and destruction could quickly spread out of control.

For FDLR, on the other hand, entering into negotiation would allow, at least, a prolongation of the group existence; it would boost its legitimacy and save it from an uncertain future in DRC.

Clearly, any potential outcome from a negotiated deal is likely to be better than its current best alternative. Despite the potential benefits of engaging FDLR in direct talks, it makes nonetheless no sense for Rwanda to initiate negotiations if it believes that FDLR would never uphold its end of any bargain and in the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism.

FDLR is known to have hardliners and others who have little incentive to follow any negotiated agreement as they stand to face serious charges and long periods of imprisonment (and, perhaps, business) should they agree to return to Rwanda.

Costs

Negotiations are not devoid of costs. Beyond the obvious direct transaction costs of entering into negotiation with FDLR – investment of time, money, manpower, and other resources -  the spill-over or indirect costs of negotiating could be high for Rwanda.

The government may be concerned about the impact of negotiations on its domestic constituents, not least pressures by survivor groups not to reward those who associated in any way with the genocide.

Negotiating might further send the message that FDLR has some legitimate claims against the government and may serve as a precedent for other disgruntled groups within the country and beyond.

Legitimacy and Morality

Providing FDLR with ‘a place at the table’ would acknowledge their existence, their actions, (and to some degrees) the validity of their interests.

To avoid validation of claims, countries often refuse to negotiate with rebels or insurgent groups, denying them any recognition or legitimacy. In the case of FDLR, there is the additional aversion to rewarding past criminal behaviour.

Rwanda has understandably a strong moral aversion to ‘shaking hands with the devil’; members of this group include individuals responsible for ‘the Crime of Crimes’. The nature, magnitude and horror of the Tutsi genocide make it repulsive to negotiate with FDLR.

Conclusion

Analysed through the framework of negotiation theory, and specifically, by weighing the interests, the probability of a satisfactory negotiated outcome, the available best alternatives, and the costs associated with negotiating, including issues of morality and legitimacy, I believe that – taken together – the costs associated with negotiation outweigh its potential benefits in this particular case.

Therefore, Rwanda’s decision not to negotiate with FDLR and, instead, to use force to achieve its immediate goal, separately and in conjunction with DRC, is, in my view, correct.

Idi Gaparayi is a consultant in legal affairs based in Kigali (idi.gaparayi@gmail.com)