This is a continuation of a narration by Capt (Rtd) Logan Ndahiro of the 1990-1994 Liberation Struggle as he remembers it. In the previous parts, he recounted key moments of the struggle including the liberation of political prisoners in Ruhengeri Prison and the subsequent battles that characterized the war.

In this series, he tackles the capture of Mulindi the eventual political/military headquarters of the struggle.

Prior to the capture of Mulindi, the two wings operated separately with the military high command operating within Rwanda near the frontline while the political wing had remained outside the country from where they continued to mobilize support and raise funds to sustain the struggle. 

By May 1992, RPA had captured about 30 or so kilometres stretching within the Rwandan territory, commonly referred to as Agasentimita (cm). This captured territory was jealously guarded and successfully defended from any enemy trespassers.

As earlier hinted, the fighting strategy and tactics had changed. The RPA forces had used a number of tactical methods unknown hitherto to enemy forces. We used positional warfare, sieging, ambushes, shelling as well as sending mobile forces to attack the enemy beyond and behind his lines of defence.

When the Chairman of the High Command, Paul Kagame, was sure the captured territory was firmly in our hands, towards the end of April 1992, he chaired a strategic High Command meeting from which he commissioned an intelligence group of Senior RPA officers to the Byumba Sector for reconnaissance.

That reconnaissance mission was dispatched to Byumba town itself and its barracks, the Gatuna Border Post and the surrounding areas of Kaniga, Rushaki, Mulindi tea factory, Bungwe Parish, Manyagiro, Mukono/Rugarama and Gishambashayo which all had enemy defences.

The Chairman then came to brief us of the new strategy where he commissioned some mobile forces to leave the captured territory to go and attack Byumba town and the surrounding areas as mentioned above.

This news excited us since, while in the Agasentimita, our mobility had been checked by the enemy defence positions. We were yearning for mobile attacks.

Show of might, intent

Toward the end of April 1992, moving from Kabuga (Tabagwe Sector), Delta and 17th Battalion joined Oscar to form the Byumba attack prong, while Alpha, Charlie, and Yankee mobile forces formed another prong where Yankee attacked and overran Kaniga and Gatuna, Charlie attacked Manyagiro, Gishambashayo and Bungwe and routed the enemy defences there.

Later on these mobile forces were joined by Bravo mobile force, 21st and 23rd battalions. I was part of Charlie Mobile Force.

Delta, Oscar and 17th mobile forces bypassed other forces and attacked Byumba Barracks in a dawn attack that surprised the enemy forces there.

Oscar Mobile Force cut off Kigali – Byumba – Gatuna road at Rukomo as 17th Battalion and Delta Mobile Force attacked the Byumba Military Barracks.

This was a show of strength on the RPA side since we could now even attack a barracks entrenched in a town having passed through enemy defences along the way.

Due to the nature and complexity of this assignment to attack Byumba, the Chairman of the High Command moved with this prong and guided a successful attack of the Byumba town.

Habitually, the Chairman of the High Command was always mindful of such complicated attacks and would be with his forces in thick and thin.

We in Manyagiro – Bungwe areas fought running battles as the enemy force started to hastily move towards Byumba in fear of being cut off by the RPA. The Byumba attack had caused a lot of panic that eased the fight for the remaining RPA mobile forces in the area. After attack on Byumba, 17th Battalion established a permanent road block at Ngondore, just an area roughly half way between Gatuna and Byumba.

For unknown reason, Alpha Mobile Force delayed on the way and arrived at the frontline on the third day. This was uncommon, given that everything had been provided for its mobility.

On their arrival, at around 3pm, they met a visibly annoyed and disappointed Chairman, who immediately subjected the entire mobile force to punitive military discipline and Alpha was really roughed-up. The Chairman himself was not a bystander in the whole exercise that lasted roughly about an hour.

When done, the Chairman, in a clearly articulate voice, told Alpha in Kiswahili, "Alpha kwakujiokoa, mwende mtoe ngome ya adui ambayo yiko Mulindingambo pale,’’ pointing a finger in that direction.

Literally, he was telling Alpha Mobile Force that they should go and attack and rout the enemy defence at Mulindi in order to redeem themselves from the previous mistakes.

We were standing atop Mukono hill that overlooks Mulindi Tea Factory situated across Gatuna – Byumba highway. The rough-up Alpha had gone through was like they had done a redress-rehearsal on this ordered attack.

No sooner had the Chairman of the High Command left than Alpha rank and file, held a hasty meeting on the tactics to use in the Mulindi attack, especially so because it was now around 4pm, dust setting in.

As it turned out that the force chose to trick the enemy by going downhill at a run in an extended formation that stretched about 2kms with a distance of about 10 meters between combatants and making all sorts of noise.

As the enemy saw Alpha’s extended formation, they might have imagined that the entire RPA force had come for their life. The Ex-Far packed up and left Mulindi Tea Factory without any resistance, not even a shot fired.

Alpha Mobile Force only had to contend with a lot of anti-personnel mines buried in the surrounding eucalyptus forest. By 8pm, on June 2, 1992, Alpha Mobile Force communicated that it had effectively sieged the factory and that the enemy had gone.

We shifted our Operational Headquarters to Mulindi the next day, June 3, 1992, and for the first time in years, I had a five-centimetre thick mattress in a house but could not sleep due to being in a closed space (a condition known as claustrophobia- abnormal fear of closed spaces).

I tossed, rolled and turned on the bed without sleep. This applied to most combatants who could afford that one night luxury.

During all this, I could not understand why the Chairman of the High Command had insisted on the capture of the Mulindi Tea Factory of all other enemy defences.

But his witty planning, his politico-military acumen and his ability to see far ahead have always been exceptional and exemplary. I shortly got to understand why.

With the re-capture and opening up of the Gatuna border and the establishment of our permanent roadblock at Ngondore, time was ripe for a home-coming of our RPF-Inkotanyi Headquarters.

By July 1992, Mulindi Tea Factory turned out to be the headquarters of both the RPF and the RPA-Inkotanyi where both the Chairman of the Front (RPF) and the RPA Chairman of the High Command sat together at U Mulindiw’Intwari until the capture of Kigali.

It was a re-union of the two organs of the front that had been physically separated since 1st October 1990 due to strategic and tactical reasons.

To be continued…