Recently I published an opinion in this column expressing my anxiety ahead of the CAF decision to endorse their preferred candidate for FIFA presidency. On the same day, the CAF Executive Committee seating in Kigali endorsed Salman Sheikh as their official candidate.
Recently I published an opinion in this column expressing my anxiety ahead of the CAF decision to endorse their preferred candidate for FIFA presidency. On the same day, the CAF Executive Committee seating in Kigali endorsed Salman Sheikh as their official candidate.
Around the same time two other FIFA candidates were present at the CHAN final in Kigali.
Infatino Gianni and Prince Ali were seen engaging executives or presidents of the African federations (FAs), visibly trying to project a friendly image and their good connection to the continental fraternity or care about Africa football.
Don’t be mistaken and think the other candidates were absent or inactive. Not all! They left behind their campaign team to do their electioneering work.
The AFC Asian confederation President Salman, freshly endorsed, did not need to be physically present at the end of CHAN.
Although anticipated, the CAF move did not go well with the only African in the race.
Tokyo Sexwale did not mince his words against CAF, saying he would remain a candidate as mandated by his Federation, and that the vote is in Zurich through a secret ballot!
He also accused CAF of spreading rumors about his candidature and trying to arm-twist him to withdraw.
Indeed CAF did not elaborate on why they left their own son to back Bahraini Salman.
Is it all about an ideological confrontation between the European bloc versus some sort of Bandoeng Africa-Asia third world alliance - to counter European or Western supremacy and keep the control over FIFA, reminiscent of the Blatter electoral strategies? Many have bought that simplistic argument.
The true reasons would probably remain confidential and known to a handful and well connected connoisseurs, which brings back the central question of CAF accountability - similarly to FIFA as a whole.
And leave space open to fallacies, conspiracy theories and serious analysis that tend to confirm the fierce power struggle within FIFA, the fight to control its financial resources and decisions process with so much executive powers vested in few hands.
Are we witnessing sophisticated maneuvers to guarantee no reversal possibility of the very controversial decision to award Qatar2022 World Cup? And that would come with serious financial, diplomatic and geopolitical consequences!
Barely two weeks before this election slated this February 26, the English FA president, Greg Dyke, told BBC that if there was evidence of corruption on that award, it should lead to an immediate cancellation.
Was he hinting at some last minute information ready for the scandal hungry media?
Was this a black mail to whom it may concern and still involved in the race?
Coincidentally, the English FA formally endorsed Infatino last week. One would imagine that the real threat was the very candidate that CAF had endorsed.
Since the corruption scandal associated with marketing contracts and World Cup choices (Germany, RSA, Russia and Qatar), the subject is itching and the matter had frightened many.
The last two selections were the last straw that triggered the wrath of the Anglo-Saxon federations.
Remember the FBI spectacular raid in Zurich at dawn during the last FIFA elective Congress in May 2015! Blatter won but resigned four days later and had never recovered since. Many other FIFA executives were jailed and or ostracised.
So every single action is magnified and put under scrutiny.
The signing of an MoU between the Asian confederation AFC and CAF represented by candidate Sheikh Salman and Issa Hayatou just a few days before the decision day has raised eyebrows.
And we don’t know if the AFC-CAF agreement will solve in substance the structural problems facing the African football: skills shortage, poor infrastructure, academies weakness, financial sustainably and lack of professionalism or if the endorsed candidate pledged to bring the World Cup within 15 years to Africa.
If those were the intended objectives, where will the resources come from? Will they come from future transparent and restructured FIFA or AFC coffers or Bahrain funds?
These questions remain pertinent if you consider the football agenda/strategies set by countries like India or China in Asia.
President Xi convinced the Central Committee of the serious Communist Party CPC to set football development as his 5th priority within the current five-year plan, aiming high at 20,000 football schools.
Moreover, Chinese clubs are buying top players for dizzying amounts. The entire former Brazilian team is squarely hired in China to prepare them to win the World Cup in 2026.
The same year the USA federation aspires to organise it and also hoping for a win after the disappointment inflicted by Qatar for the 2022 edition.
Even on the continent, dissenting voices are heard from some powerful federations notably from Algeria and Egypt rather endorsing the Jordanian candidate Prince Ali.
This is very symptomatic as Algeria is the highest ranked on the continent at the FIFA table and the second Egypt has hosted CAF head office for decades. So they know the inside story better than many!
Even if this might be read as a personality clash with CAF President, or bitterness (Algeria was meant to host CAN2017 awarded to Gabon) and or some other masked conflicts (of religious or political nature) beyond our reach, this is rather embarrassing for CAF.
If these two countries go all the way with some other smaller federations, including those loyal to the SA candidate, there would be a split vote in Africa favoring the European candidate Infatino, already backed by three American confederations. And who will probably win at the second round with the African delegates left to decide on the spot.
In that case, CAF would have squandered the opportunity to negotiate high and wisely his backing.
Worse, it could end up straining the relation between CAF and FIFA’s new Presidency from the onset.
The current CAF leadership could even be challenged at the top during the next CAF Executive elections slated for 2017 with the emergence of a new bloc feeling sidelined by the Hayatou camp.
Given the above, there are serious doubts that the said CAF endorsement would turn into a winning strategy.
Instead, CAF leadership might find out sooner that they had a bet on the wrong horse!